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This paper develops a descriptive framework for siting large scale 
technological facilities such as liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, and 
suggests ways of using analyses to improve the process. A key feature of 
these problems is that they involve relatively new technologies where 
there has not been a long history with which to construct a statistical 
data base. Hence the interested parties will each have different esti- 
mates of the probabilities and losses associated with events that affect 
the environment or safety of the population. 
The decision making process can be characterized as a sequence of 
decisions, subject to change over time, which are influenced by exo- 
genous factors and new legislation. Each of the separate decisions 
involves an input phase and interaction phase. The input phase specifies 
the relevant alternatives and attributes associated with a particular deci- 
sion. The interaction phase focuses on the nature of the conflicts 
between the different parties in evaluating the alternatives. Conflicts are 
often difficult to resolve because each stakeholder in the process has his 
own objectives, a limited information base shaped by these objectives and 
scarce computational resources. 
We illustrate the above descriptive framework through a case study 
of the LNG siting process in California. The paper then explores possible 
ways of improving the input and interaction phases through more struc- 
tured analyses. Specific attention is given to the role of decision analysis, 
the analytic hierarchy process, examining assumptions and the use of 
interactive computer models for scenario generation. The paper con- 
cludes by suggesting future research needs on designing policy instru- 
ments for helping to reconcile conflicts between the vying interest par- 
ties. Promising areas for more problem-focused research include the 
role of insurance and compensation schemes. 
KEY WORDS: Siting, Decision Processes, Conflict, Use of Analysis, Low Pro- 
bability Events. 
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SITING HAZARDOUS V L l T I E S :  
LESSONS FROM LNG 
Howard Kunreuther and John Lathrop 2 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Society has become increasingly concerned with the appropriate 
procedures for evaluating projects which promise to yield long-run bene- 
fits, but also create potentially catastrophic consequences. Recent exam- 
ples of such problems are the sitlng of energy facilities such as nuclear 
'The research reported in this paper is supported by the Bundesministerium fllr Forschwng 
und Technologic, F.R.G., contract no. 321/7591/RGB 8001. W e  support for this work is 
gratefully acknowledged, the views expressed are the authors' own and are not necessarily 
shared by the sponsor. This paper is part of a larger project to siting decisions of Liquefied 
Natural Gas Facilities. 
2 ~ e  would like to achowledge very helpful discussions with our IIASA colleagues: Hermann 
Atz, Joanne Lberooth,  Giandomenico Majone, Michiel Schwarz, Craig Sinclair, Michael 
Thompson and James Vaupel. Randolph Deutsch, J6rg Finsinger, Ralph Keeney, Paul Klein- 
dorfer and Detlof von Winterfeldt provided helpful comments on an earlier draft of this pa- 
per. A more detailed discussion of the problems associated with siting liquefied natural gas 
facilities in European countries and the United States appears in H. Kunreuther, J. Lin- 
nerooth and R. Starnes, Liquefrod Energy Gas  Faciiay Siting: An International Compcrris- 
on, Proceedings of a ILASA Task Force Meeting, 2926 September 1980, Laxenburg, Austria: 
ILASA (in press). 
power plants or liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals. 
Thls paper has two principal purposes. Utilizing recent theoretical 
and empirical contributions to the literature on choice under uncer- 
tainty, it proposes a descriptive framework as to how such decisions are 
reached in the United States. On the basis of this framework, suggestions 
are made for improving the process. The paper thus is designed to 
integrate descriptive aspects with prescriptive recommendations. 
Section I1 details the elements of a descriptive framework for siting 
large-scale facilities. A key feature of the process is the interaction of 
interested parties, each of whom have specific goals and objectives, a lim- 
ited inlormation base shaped by these objectives, and scarce computa- 
tional resources. 
Section 111 illustrates the framework with empirical evidence from 
the LNG siting decision process in California which has been studied 
extensively (see Ahern 1980; Deutsch 1980; Linnerooth 1980; and Lathrop 
1980). Section IV indicates how we might improve the current decision 
procedures by recognizing that the political process is based on a 
number of institutional and legal constraints which may be difficult to 
change. The concluding section suggests future research needs with 
respect to developing policies for reconciling differences between 
interested parties in the siting debate. 
11. A DESCRIPTIVE FRAMEWORK FOR SOCIETAL DECISION MAKING 
RELEVANT CONCEPTS 
In contrast to most textbook analyses of decision-making under 
uncertainty, where there is a well-specified set of probabilities of certain 
events occurring and potential gains or losses from them, the problems 
discussed in t h s  paper involve more fundamental uncertainties. For one 
thing, there has not been a long history with which to build a statistical 
data-base. The technologies are relatively new and in many cases past 
experience provides us with limited guidance as to the chances of severe 
accidents occurring. In a similar vein one has to speculate as to what the 
losses might be should a particular catastrophic event occur in a given 
location. These two elements of uncertainty represent a challenge for 
both risk analysis and decision-making . 
On the analysis side there is a need to systematically estimate pro- 
babilities and consequences from both past data and judgmental studies. 
There is an extensive literature from controlled laboratory experiments 
over the past decade which have uncovered a set of biases and heuristics 
that individuals utilize in dealing with low-probability events (see Fischh- 
off, et al. in press; Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Other studies have sug- 
gested that the context in which a problem is framed plays a key role in 
how people make their decisions (Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Hershey, 
e t  d.  in press). These findings, partly due to computational limitations 
on the part of individuals, present a challenge to the analyst who would 
like to improve the de cision-making process. 
An attempt in this direction has been taken by Fairley (1977) who 
provides a detailed set of guidelines for estimating "small" accident pro- 
babilities based on a consideration of catastrophic risk analyses for LNG 
marine transportation. His motivation for suggesting systematic analyses 
is that there is a great danger that many sources of an  accident will oth- 
erwise be omitted. In addition, there are numerous opportunities for bias 
with respect to judgmental estimates of accident probabilities when there 
is not a long hstory of past events. Similar reasoning would apply to the 
analysis of losses from a given accident, such as a major breach of an LNG 
tank. 
On the decisiun- making side, the lack of a detailed data base implies 
that different interested parties will have different estimates of the pro- 
babilities and the losses that guide their own judgments. We will look at  
the process in terms of a scenario involving a number of different deci- 
sions, which taken together resolve a particular problem. Some of the 
decisions may be solved in parallel by different parties; others may be 
dealt with sequentially. 
The decentralized and sequential nature of the process are key con- 
cepts which guide the descriptive framework. March (1978) characterizes 
this process as one of limited rationality, whereby indimduals and groups 
simplify a large problem into smaller pieces because of the difficulties 
they have in considering all alternatives and all information. Support for 
these concepts a t  the level of governmental, firm and consumer 
decision-making comes from several quarters. Lindblom (1959), Bray- 
brooke and Lindblom (1963) emphasize the incrementalism in decisions 
made by bureaucracies where there is a tendency for government 
agencies to "muddle through" by making small changes from the status 
quo rather than attempting to structure and solve a larger problem. 
Cyert and March (1963), in their classic study of the behavioral theory of 
the firm, demonstrate empirically that organizations decentralize deci- 
sions and attend to different goals' and objectives at  different times. 
Bettmann (1979) integrates findings from a number of studies on consu- 
mer choice whch  suggest that individuals simplify the decision-making 
process by decomposing the problem, utilizing limited search and behav- 
ing sequentially with appropriate feedback loops. 
Another important concept, whch also relates to the uncertainty of 
information in probabilities and losses, is the i m p o r t a n c e  of e z o g e n o u s  
e v e n t s  in influencing the decision process. Random events, such as disas- 
ters, play a critical role in triggering specific actions to "prevent" future 
crises. The small data base for judging the frequency of low probability 
events, coupled with systematic biases of individuals in dealing with con- 
cepts of chance and uncertainty, increase the importance of a salient 
event in the decision-making process. Tversky and Kahneman (1973) 
describe this phenomenon under the heading of availability whereby one 
judges the frequency of a n  event by the ease with which one can retrieve 
it from memory. The importance of past experience in influencing 
insurance purchase decisions against low probability events (Kunreuther, 
e t  a l .  1978) reflects this characteristic of human behavior. 
March and Olsen (1976) suggest that random events and their timing 
play a critical role in many organizational decisions because of the ambi- 
guity of many situations and the limited attention that can be given to 
any particular problem by the interested parties unless it is perceived as 
being critical. They provide empirical evidence to support their theory 
using empirical studies of organizations in Denmark, Norway and the 
United States. 
In a similar spirit Holling (1981) summarizes empirical evidence on 
how unexpected events played a role in the institutional response to 
environmental problems. Studies in five different areas of social or 
economic importance reveal that specific events (e.g., the destruction of 
forests by an outbreak of the spruce budworm) frequently generate 
surprise and trigger specific policies designed to cope with the resulting 
negative outcomes. 
With respect to legislative decision-making, Walker (1977) notes the 
importance of graphically and easily understood evidence of trouble as an 
importance factor in setting the discretionary agenda of the US Congress 
or a government agency. He also suggests that the political appeal of 
dealing with a specific Problem is increased if it has an impact on large - 
numbers of people. To support these points, Walker presents empirical 
evidence on the passage of safety legislation in the US. Numerous exam- 
ples of this process are also provided by Lawless (1977) through a series 
of case histories of problems involving the impact of technology on 
society. He points out that frequently: 
new information of an "alarming" nature is announced and is 
given rapid and widespread visibility by means of modern mass 
communication media. Almost overnight the case can become a 
subject of discussion and concern to much of the populace, and 
generate strong pressures to evaluate and remedy the problem 
as rapidly as possible (p. 16). 
In the case of decisions such as the siting of facilities, random events 
such as an LNG explosion or an oil spill may be sufficiently graphic and 
affect enough people to generate surprise and cause a reversal of earlier 
decisions, inject other alternatives into the process and change the rela- 
tive strength of parties interested in the decision outcome. The mass 
media may play a critical role in focusing on these specific events and in 
many cases exaggerating their importance. 
MODEL FORMULATION 
The concepts discussed above have motivated the following descrip- 
tive framework of the facility siting process. A scenario consists of a 
sequence of decisions t D l  , . . . , D, j ,  which have to be made by different 
interested parties. In focusing on any particular problem, it is necessary 
to specify what the n different decisions are that comprise a particular 
scenario. For example, Lathrop (1980) and Linnerooth (1980) have con- 
structed a detailed flow diagram of the different decision points with 
respect to  the siting of the LNG terminal in California. Here the process 
begins with the Western LNG Terminal Company filing an application with 
the Federal Power Commission (FPC) for terminal facilities. It continues 
through a set of interactions between federal, state and local governmen- 
tal agencies, special interest groups and the Western LNG Terminal Com- 
pany. In the case of nuclear power plant licensing decisions, Jackson and 
Kunreuther (1981) have constructed a scenario which emphasizes the 
decentralized nature of decisions by separate divisions of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. The performance of a plant under a series of 
predetermined accident scenarios is a basis for the final decision as to 
whether or not to approve a power plant. 
These two examples suggest that, although one can look at  a particu- 
lar decision in isolation, it will be integrated with other actions by being 
dependent on earlier decisions (e.g., the case of LNG siting) or by being 
integrated at  a later stage with other decisions which are made indepen- 
dently of it (e.g., the licensing of nuclear power plants). 
Consider a particular decision, D j ,  (e.g., whether or not an LNG ter- 
minal is acceptable with regard to population risk), which is part of an 
overall scenario. Figure 1 depicts the relevant aspects of the process. 3 
At any time period, t ,  there are a set  of ezogenous factors which limit the 
set  of alternatives for consideration. For example, a disaster may trigger 
specific legislation whch provides restrictions on where a hazardous facil- 
ity can be located. For each set of alternatives there are interested par- 
ties who enter the arena. One set  of alternatives then can determine the 
attributes (e.g. number of lives lost from an LNG explosion) whch are 
considered important by a t  least one of these parties. In Figure 1 we 
refer to the relationship between these three components as the input 
phase of the process. Thus if one changes the composition of parties as 
well as the alternatives, one will also change the relative importance of 
attributes. For example, if special interest groups are concerned with a 
particular site, then the safety factor may be treated as much more 
relevant than if these parties do not have an input into the final decision. 
Similarly, if certain attributes are specifically introduced into the picture 
'A more structured model for the siting process has since been developed a t  U S A  and is d i s  
cussed in Kunreuther, Lathrop and Linnerooth (1981). 
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by one of the interested parties, then this may cause other groups to play 
a more active role in the process. For example, if the federal government 
suggests the critical importance of safety factors as part of the siting 
decision, then concerned citizens may unite to prevent their community 
from being chosen as a site. 
Each interested party is likely to have a different set of attributes 
that they consider to  be important to the particular problem. Further- 
more, there is no guarantee that two interested parties who focus on the 
same attribute will measure it in the same manner. For example, public 
interest groups concerned with the safety of potential sites may have a 
different estimate of the number of lives lost from a severe accident than 
the gas companies or the consortium proposing the project. Over time 
the nature and importance of these attributes may also change due to 
exogenous factors and a new set of alternatives. 
When it comes to the interaction phase, stakeholders are likely to 
evaluate different alternatives by looking for satisfactory options rather 
than trying to find an optimal solution (Cyert and March 1963). For each 
decision Dj there may be some level of a particular attribute that is 
deemed satisfactory, but that level may differ between interested parties. 
For example, public interest groups may specify an acceptable level of 
risk to be lower than the gas company proposing the project. As a result 
these two interested parties may have differing views on the acceptability 
of alternative sites even if they agree on the chances of an accident. 
When such conflicts occur, they may cause long delays in reachng a final 
decision because of the difficulties in resolving conflicts based on value 
differences. Eventually they may be resolved through some form of 
consensus by the interested parties, by court rulings or by governmental 
bodies with specific legislative powers to settle the controversy. For 
some problems no resolution may take place and the status quo is main- 
tained. 
Looking at  the analysis phase depicted in Figure 1, a central com- 
ponent is the nature of the conflicts between parties. If no final action is 
taken on a particular decision during period t because of a failure to 
resolve certain conflicts, this is treated schematically as postponing 
action until the next period. In period t +1, a set of exogenous events 
may occur that substantially change the situation. The breach of a 
storage tank or the discovery of an  earthquake fault may reveal certain 
features of facilities or sites which may make them unacceptable. These 
exogenous events may change the relative importance of different 
interested parties and attributes. In addition, the events and the public's 
reaction to them may trigger new legislation which deem certain previ- 
ously satisfactory alternatives unacceptable and force a re-evaluation of 
earlier decisions lD1 , . . . , D j + l ] .  
To summarize, there are a set of decisions whch have to be made 
over time as part of a scenario for a particular problem. There are laws 
and regulations which guide the acceptability of specific alternatives and 
there are different interested parties involved in the process. Because of 
the uncertainty regarding the probability and potential impacts of catas- 
trophic events, interested parties with different goals and objectives and 
with limited computational capacities may have different estimates of the 
risks associated with specific actions (e.g, the siting of an  LNG terminal 
at  a particular location). Furthermore, random events can have a major 
impact on the decision-making process by triggering new legislation 
which may change the set of alternatives, relevant stakeholders and attri- 
butes for consideration. Conflicts between these parties can lead to 
lengthy delays. 
III. THE LNG SlTING DECISION IN CALIFORNIA 
The above descriptive framework outlined in Figure 1, will be illus- 
trated here by analyzing the decision process associated with siting an 
LNG terminal in California. This description will reveal implications of the 
structure of such a process in reference to societal decision-making for 
low probability events. We will first describe the nature of the problem, 
delineate the relevant interested parties and attributes perceived to be 
important, comment on the implications of this structure, and then dis- 
cuss the role of exogenous events on the decision process. 
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a medium for transporting energy that 
has the potential, albeit with very low probability, of creating severe 
losses. To transport natural gas over long ocean distances it has to be 
converted to liquid form at about -160 '~ and 1 /600 the volume. It is then 
shipped in specially constructed tankers and received at  a terminal 
where it undergoes regasification and is then distributed. The entire sys- 
tem (i.e. the liquefication facility, the LNG tanker and the receiving ter- 
minal and regasification facility) can cost more than $1 billion to 
construct (Office of Technology Assessment 1977). The siting problem of 
interest consists of two principal decisions: whether the proposed LNG 
project is in the best interest of society in terms of its impact on the 
future U.S. energy mix ( D ~ ) ,  and if so, whether the proposed site is 
appropriate in terms of meeting specific safety, environmental and 
economic criteria ( D ~ ) .  Note that the alternatives for Dl are whether or 
not to have an LNG project, whle those for D2 relate to proposed termi- 
nals at  specific sites. 
INTERESTED PARTIES AND RELEVANT ATTRIBUTES 
There are a set of interested parties associated with each of the 
above two decisions. Some of these parties are specified by law (e.g. 
government agencies), others play a role because of specific concerns 
with the hazard (e.g. public interest groups) and others because of their 
economic interest in the project (e.g. gas companies). In the case of Dl, 
there are three principal stakeholders, each of whom considers different 
attributes as important. The g a s  c o m p a n y  or the consortium proposing 
the project considers such attributes as gas price and capital base as 
they affect its financial position, degree of control over the source, and 
supply security. 
The second party is the D e p a r t m e n t  of E n e r g y  (DOE), wbch must 
ascertain whether the project is in the national i n t e r e ~ t . ~  Two agencies 
within the DOE are involved: the Federal  E n e r g y  R e g u l a t o r y  C o m m i s s i o n  
'prior to  1977 this responsibility resided with the Federal Power Commission (FPC). 
(FERC), which rules on site and project suitability, and the Economic 
Regulatory  Adminis tra t ion (ERA), whch judges the effect of the project 
on balance of payments and national supply security. Among the princi- 
pal attributes that these two agencies are supposed to consider are the 
security of supply, the proposed LNG price in relation to the price of 
alternative supplies, impact of the price schedule on conservation of 
energy, and whether the proposed site meets safety and environmental 
requirements as stated in any national guidelines (DOE/ERA 1977). The 
third principal party involved in D l  is the California Public Uti l i t ies  Com- 
m i s s i o n  (CPUC), whch has responsibility a t  the state level for issues simi- 
lar to those considered by DOE a t  the federal level. 
In addition to these three parties, other agencies set safety stan- 
dards for all proposed LNG projects. The Office of Pipeline S a f e t y  Regu- 
la t ion  (OPSR), is responsible for the landward side of the LNG terminal, 
while the Coast Quard has jurisdiction over the marine side of the termi- 
nal, including ship movements and the port on of the LNG system that 
connects the tanker to the storage system. 
The site-specific decision, D2, involves some of the same parties as 
D l ,  as well as additional groups. The set of relevant attributes are likely 
to differ from the ones related to the first decision. For example, the Gas 
Company  now focuses on site-specific costs, accessibility of tankers, and 
where appropriate land-use and environmental factors (OTA 1977). The 
FERC examines site suitability with particular attention to environmental 
impacts and safety. 
Before 1977 the city and county governments had responsibility for 
evaluating local impacts of a project, whle at  the state level the Cali for-  
n i a  Coastal  Comm.ission (CCC) ruled on the impact of a particular site on 
the environment with special sensitivity to preservation of coastal natural 
resources. These agencies were required to hold public hearings in which 
all the parties had a chance to be represented, including special interest 
groups and local citizens groups concerned with safety and environmental 
impacts. The California LNG Terminal Siting Act of 1977 essentially 
removed local authority and centralized the state approval authority in 
the CPUC, changing the CCC role to determining a ranking of alternative 
sites. 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION PROCESS STRUCTURE 
The current LNG siting process illustrates two key features of multi- 
party societal decision processes. First, the decision is disaggregated in 
such a way that  each agency focuses on a subset of all the attributes in 
comparing different sites. For example, the CCC, who feels its responsi- 
bility is to preserve the environment, is now given authority to rank the 
proposed sites in California. The CPUC, who focuses primarily on ques- 
tions of supply reliability, has final authority on approval of the proposed 
site. This decision can be made independently of the CCC rankings. No 
single agency is now given a mandate to make tradeoffs between environ- 
mental and energy supply concerns in considering the proposed sites. 
The second feature of multi-party decision processes illustrated in 
the California case is the importance of the structure of that process. 
Where there are conflicts of interest between different parties, the most 
effective power normally lies with the agency in the position to make the 
final decision. In the case of California, a key question considered in 
drafting the LNG Terminal Siting Act of 1977 was whether a conservation- 
minded group, such as the CCC, or an agency concerned with energy 
needs such as the CPUC, would have final siting authority. Once the CPUC 
was chosen, the final decision regarding a site was constrained in dif- 
ferent ways than if the CCC had been given this authority. The dynamics 
and the structure of the process had a critical bearing on the final deci- 
sion. 
But there are broader implications of the multi-party character of 
societal decision processes for low-probability events. Conflicts among 
parties are to be expected, since each stakeholder implicitly assigns dif- 
ferent importance weights to the relevant attributes. Yet when one is 
concerned with low-probability events associated with a new technology 
(e.g. determining the chances and consequences of a severe accident of 
an LNG terminal), the analyses marshaled by the conflicting parties are 
not based on statistical analysis and tested assumptions. Instead, the 
analyses must rely on subjective probabilities and choices of assumption 
sets from a wide range of defensible scenarios (Lathrop and Linnerooth 
1981). The net result is that analysis does not play as important a role in 
such cases as it might if actuarial data were available on which to esti- 
mate probabilities and losses. 
Arguments concerning low-probability events often involve the con- 
cept of acceptable risk. Whle the definition of acceptable risk assumes 
many guises (Lathrop in press), a procedure like the following is often 
employed: a detailed risk analysis of a proposed site specifies the 
chances of death per year (p )  from LNG-related accidents to an indivi- 
dual a t  risk. If p is below some threshold level, p *, then the project is 
considered safe; if p > p  then it is not. For example, the FERC estimated 
the values of p for three proposed California LNG terminal sites as rang- 
ing from 2.10-? to 8.10-?. It pointed out that such risks are comparable 
to the risks from natural events such as lightning, tornados, and hurri- 
canes, and concluded: "The staff believes that t h s  level constitutes an 
acceptable risk to the public (FERC 1978) .~  Yet. of course, this form of 
argument does not in itself resolve safety debates, as the different par- 
ties can argue over what values of both p and p * are appropriate for the 
case at  hand. 
ROLE OF EXOGENOUS EVENTS 
Another implication of the decision process associated with facility 
siting is that exogenous events can play an important role in triggering 
new coalitions and frequently new legislation. Each interested party 
focuses on limited information and uses the data in different ways. Due 
to the difficulty of resolving stakeholder conflicts, a particular event can 
' ~ e e n e ~ ,  st a1. (1979) utilize a particular p in support of the acceptability of an LNG ter- 
minal in Fatagorda Bay, Texas. They cite a rough criterion for risk acceptability of 
p = 10- suggested by tarr 1969 , and compare it to their estimated p for the Matagor- i o  da Bay terminal of 2.1 0- . 
cause a reversal or reinvestigation of a particular decision if the case has 
not been finalized. Consider the four following examples associated with 
LNG siting in the United States: 
In 1973 an LNG tank in Staten Island, New York, exploded and 
the roof collapsed burying 40 workers. There was no LNG in the 
tank but it had seeped through the insulation and caused a huge 
fire. A result of this explosion was the increased concern with 
the dangers of LNG by Staten Island residents. The neighbor- 
hood organization called BLAST, which was formed a year before 
the accident, attracted considerable attention and interest 
because of the media coverage of the tank explosion. In the 
context of our descriptive model of choice, a new interested 
party played a key role because of a random event. What may 
have been a foregone decision regarding the location of an LNG 
tank in Staten Island became problematical (Davis 1979). 
The worst LNG accident occurred in 1944 when the storage tank 
operated by the East Ohio Gas Company in Cleveland ruptured, 
spilling LNG on adjacent streets and sewers. The liquid eva- 
porated, the gas ignited and exploded, resulting in 128 deaths, 
300 injuries and approximately 87 million in property damage. 
An investigation of this accident indicated that the tank failed 
because it was construction of 3.5% nickel steel, which becomes 
brittle when it comes in contact with the extreme cold of LNG. 
All plants are now built with 9% nickel steel, aluminum or con- 
crete and the storage tanks are surrounded by dikes capable of 
containing the contents of the tank if a rupture occurs. This 
example illustrates the impact of a particular incident on the 
passage of new regulations (Davis 1979). 
In December of 1976, the Los Angeles City Council voted to allow 
work to begin on an LNG terminal in San Pedro Bay. The follow- 
ing day an explosion ripped the oil tanker Sansinena in Los 
Angeles harbor leaving 9 dead and 50 injured. A week later the 
City Council commissioned a study as to the relative safety of 
the proposed site. They later approved the terminal. This 
explosion, although it had nothing to do with liquefied natural 
gas, alerted many Californians to the potential dangers of LNG. 
Until the publication of several worst case scenarios in 1976 on 
the possible consequences of a $300 million terminal in Oxnard 
in California, there was general agreement by almost all stake- 
holders that Oxnard would be an acceptable site for an LNG ter- 
minal. At the time even the Sierra Club was in favor of this loca- 
tion. (They changed their feelings about Oxnard in 1977.) One 
worst case scenario indicated that a spill of 125,000 cubic 
meters of LNG from all five tanks on a tanker would cause a 
vapor cloud which would affect up to 70,000 people. Any 
resident could look on a map to determine whether the cloud 
covered h s  own house (Ahern 1980). No estimate of a probabil- 
ity was attached to this scenario. The graphic depiction of these 
consequences generated a public reaction by groups of local 
citizens. The California legislature was influenced by t h s  public 
reaction. One legislative staff member stressed that it was not 
possible to allow a site that would lead to a large number of 
deaths in a catastrophe.6 As a result, new siting regulations 
were passed stating that no more than an average of 10 people 
per square mile could be withn one mile of the terminal and no 
more than 60 withn four miles of the terminal. The President's 
National Energy Plan incorporated similar population guidelines 
which effectively ruled out any h g h  density areas as candidates 
for an LNG terminal. Ths  example illustrates how the context in 
which information is presented (e .g., a worst case scenario) may 
provoke strong reactions by interested parties and eventually 
lead to legislative changes. 
W. IMPROVING THE FACILlTY SITING PROCESS: PRESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
The above descriptive framework has revealed the set of difficult 
problems associated with the input and interaction phases of the facility 
siting process. In t h s  section we will explore possible ways of improving 
each of these phases of the decision process through more structured 
analyses. How successful these techniques are likely to be will vary with 
each specific problem and depends crucially on the resulting dynamics 
between the interested parties. 
'This comment was made to John Lathrop in an i n t e ~ e w  in Sacramento, California, in July 
1980, regarding the siting process of an LNG terminal. 
THE INPUT PHASE 
Keeney (1980) has shown how decision analysis can help structure 
the siting decision but has focused primarily on the perspective of a sin- 
gle decision-maker rather than more than one interested party with con- 
flicting objectives and different information bases. Yet many of the gen- 
eral concepts proposed by Keeney are relevant for facilitating the input 
phase of our descriptive fr~mework. It is particularly important to 
specify the set of decisions t D 1 ,  . . . ,D,j that have to be made, how they 
relate to each other, and the relative importance each party gives to 
specific attributes. 7 
Figure 2 is a representation of the interrelationship between parties, 
attributes, and alternatives for one decision D2.  The figure is made up of 
three two-dimensional matrices. The upper left matrix relates alterna- 
tives, sites A, B, C or no site, with attributes: supply interruption risk, 
risk to life and limb, land-use environmental degradation and financial 
cost, respectively. The cell entries range from "--", a very unfavorable 
outcome, to "++", a very favorable outcome. 
Ths matrix, as it is drawn, implies that either there is a supra 
decision-maker who has characterized each site with respect to its rank- 
ing with regard to different attributes or there is consensus among the 
different interested parties on these rankings. In reality, there may be 
differences between how the relevant actors perceive each of the pro- 
posed sites. Thus, industry might view the cost to society of having no 
'see Keeney and Raiffa (1876) for a more detailed discussion of techniques for assessing the 
value tradeoffs of a decision maker among several attributes. 
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Figure 2: Relationship between Parties, Attributes and Alternatives 
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site as being very unfavorable (as actually shown in Figure 2). Local 
interest groups might have a different view on the subject. In this case, 
each of these interested parties would construct their own alternative- 
attribute matrices. The shaded matrix on the lower left relates attri- 
butes to parties: government regulator (e.g, the CPUC or FERC), govern- 
ment coastal zone planner (e.g. the CCC), industry (e.g., the gas com- 
pany), societal interest group (e.g., the Sierra Club) and local interest 
group (e.g. nnighboring landowners), respectively. The cell entries range 
from no shading, indicating little or no relative concern with the particu- 
lar attribute by the party, to dark shading, a great deal of concern. The 
right matrix could have been generated from more quantitative versions 
of the two left matrices. The cell entries reflect the relative rankings of 
each of the alternative sites by each of the interested parties. 
The value of developing a structured approach to the problem, such 
as the matrix developed in Figure 2, is that it points out differences 
between the parties. The diagram is sufficiently simplistic in that it does 
not consider possible uncertainties as to whch outcomes will result if dif- 
ferent alternatives are chosen. It also does not consider the types of 
decision procedures which each of the parties are likely to utilize in 
determining the relative rankings between alternatives. These issues are 
more appropriately discussed in the interaction phase to which we now 
turn. 
INTERACTION PHASE 
Suppose that at  the end of the input phase, we were able to arrive at  
a set of matrices, such as the one depicted in Figure 2, where each of the 
five different interested parties had their own ranking between sites. One 
way to resolve differences would be to assign specific weights to  each of 
the parties and choose the alternative which received the highest 
weighted score. This rather arbitrary way of resolving conflicts implies 
that  there is some supra decision-maker who has the authority to assign 
these weights. In reality, t h s  is rarely the case. Instead, there is a pro- 
cess of bargaining, negotiation and long-term delays induced by t h s  con- 
flict as illustrated by the California siting process. Several approaches 
have been proposed for reducing these conflicts. 
THE ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS 
Saaty (1980) has developed an approach for reconciling differences 
between parties. His analytic hierarchy process (AHP) is a systematic 
procedure for representing the elements of a problem through a 
hierarchcal structure. By decomposing the problem into its smaller con- 
stituent parts one only has to make simple pairwise comparison judg- 
ments to develop priorities in each hierarchy. 
To illustrate how a hierarchy might be constructed for the LNG siting 
problem, consider the illustrative example presented in Figure 2. We 
have represented the problem of choosing an appropriate site in terms of 
a four level herarchy, as depicted in Figure 3. The first level is the single 
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Figure 3 :  Hierarchical Structure for Siting LNG Facility 
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overall objective: Which LNG site (if any) to select. The second level 
specifies the set of five interested parties and then lists the attributes 
which are considered to be important to each of these groups (Level 3). 
The lowest level consists of the set of alternatives available at a given 
point in time. 
Priorities are established withn each level of the hierarchy by 
assessing the relative importance of one element over the other in a pair- 
wise comparison with respect to the criterion in the next hgher  level. 
For example, the importance of each of the interested parties with 
respect to the others (level 2) will be determined in reference to the 
question of siting a facility (Level 1). A measurement theory is used to 
determine the priorities of the hierarchy based on the judgmental data 
provided by the decision-maker(s). 
The potential success of the AHP for problems such as the siting of 
LNG facilities depends on the ability of the analyst to bring the relevant 
parties together, to elicit value judgments and to reconcile differences 
between the different stakeholders with respect to assigning priority 
weights in pairwise comparisons. The LNG siting process in California 
reveals that each of the parties had their own objectives as well as their 
own possibly hdden  agenda. Some of the stakeholders may be reluctant 
to articulate their value structure for fear that they will lose some of 
their negotiating power as well as being publicly responsible for their 
positions. Ward Edwards (1981) encountered this latter problem in his 
study of evaluating school desegregation plans for Los Angeles. He noted 
that the interested parties in a societal decision problem are unlikely to 
reveal their value structure because this information then becomes 
public and groups would be accountable for numerical judgments. 
Whether the Saaty approach can overcome this problem with respect to 
such highly emotional charged issues as LNG siting is still an open ques- 
tion. Even if each party is willing to provide relevant pairwise comparis- 
ons it is not clear how one utilizes this approach when there are signifi- 
cant differences between the weights each of them assigns. 
EXAMINING ASSUMPTIONS 
One way to understand and possibly reconcile differences between 
parties is to have each of them state the assumptions which they are util- 
izing in arriving at  their conclusions. For example, industry would have 
to provide a rationale as to why it ranked site C as most desirable and the 
"no site" alternative as least desirable. Representatives of societal and 
local interest groups wold have to defend their assumptions regarding 
their choices, which in this case were in the reverse order, Mitroff, Emsh- 
off, and Kilmann (19'79) have proposed t b s  type of dialectical approach to 
planning, as a way for each of the interested parties to etter appreciate 
the other's position and perhaps arrive a t  some compromise. Majone 
(19'79) also subscribes to such a process for decisions like that of facility 
siting, where the knowledge base is so poorly understood that t h s  type of 
open discussion is likely to improve everyone's understanding of the 
problem. 
Since there is limited statistical evidence which one can utilize for 
defending one's position, it may be possible to undertake some type of 
sensitivity analysis to examine the consequences of changing specific 
assumptions. For example, suppose one is uncertain as to the magnitude 
of the methane cloud dispersion should there be a tank rupture of an LNG 
storage tank. By acknowledging this type of uncertainty and examining 
the consequences of locating plants in each of the three proposed loca- 
tions, one can determine how important differences will be in terms of 
favoring one site over another. Even if t h s  type of analysis does not 
reconcile differences, it will at least indicate to all the concerned parties 
on what basis one alternative is preferred over another. 
UTILIZING INTERACTIVE COMPUTER MODELING 
It it is impossible to bring the different interested parties together, 
then other techniques may have to be used. One of the must promising 
approaches is the use of .interactive computer models for scenario gen- 
eration. Each interested party would be able to construct his/her own 
scenario as to potential consequences of adopting one strategy over 
another, and determine the consequences of changes in assumptions of 
different parameters. The computer terminal plays the role of a giant 
calculator by processing new data and displaying the resulting outputs. 
Having already constructed different matrices, such as the ones that 
comprise Figure 2, each stakeholder would be in a position to articulate 
the potential consequences of say, locating an LNG terminal at several 
proposed sites or deciding not to construct a project. At this point, it 
would be possible to develop not only "worst-case scenarios," but also less 
extreme situations, including the possibility that no accident occurs. 8 
'This approach differs from decision analysis by focusing on individual scenarios rather than 
a probability distribution over outcomes. For a more detailed discussion of interactive com- 
There undoubtedly will be differences between the way interested 
parties view the situation, but the advantage of interactive-computer 
models is that these differences can then be examined in some detail to 
stimulate discussion between the interested parties. For example, 
scenarios could be generated which would permit one to analyze very 
uncertain data (such as probability and loss of information) to determine 
their impact on relative rankings of sites. 
For example, suppose one estimated the annual probability of a 
severe accident to be between p and p2 with losses ranging from L 1  and 
L2. One could then develop scenarios which examine the relative merits 
of different alternatives as one changed these estimates. If specific sites 
were preferred over a wide range of values for probabilities and losses 
then this would simplify the choice process. If the rankings changed as pi 
and Lj  were varied, then this would suggest that these estimates be 
refined if possible. 
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The resolution of conflicts between interested parties may be 
extremely difficult even if one uses the more structured approaches pro- 
posed above. In fact, our descriptive framework suggests that interested 
parties may not want to get together to solve a particular problem unless 
they are forced to by existing legislation. Reconciliation of stakeholder 
conflicts is a time-consuming and threatening process since it involves 
puter models in a policy context see Kunreuther, of al. (1878). 
detailed analysis on the part of each of the groups and acceptance of 
responsibility for one's actions. From a political standpoint, this may not 
always be the wisest thng  to do. Hence, the above prescriptive sugges- 
tions can only be viewed as a starting point for developing a dialogue 
between the parties. We need more research on designing policy instru- 
ments for reconciling differences between the vying groups. 
One of the critical questions that needs to be addressed is how to 
design mechanisms for controlling uncertain and unknown consequences 
of a particular. decision. For example, in the case of the siting of an LNG 
facility we have limited statistical evidence to estimate probabilities and 
losses associated with a catastrophic accident and there is no experimen- 
tal laboratory except the real world from which to obtain such data. Hol- 
ling (1981) points out that there are two extreme reactions to this con- 
cern with an unknown and uncertain future: regulation and prediction. 
We have seen these two forces a t  work with respect to LNG siting in the 
form of new restrictions as to the location of a terminal regarding popula- 
tion density (regulation) and new design features of a terminal to prevent 
an accident (prediction). Interestingly enough, these changes in siting 
procedures were triggered by exogenous events and crises and were 
designed to reduce the chances that an undesirable event would occur in 
the future. Holling (1981) noted similar reactions to a variety of environ- 
mental problems which he and his colleagues at  the Institute of Resource 
Ecology (University of British Columbia) examined thorough a series of 
case studies. 
Another area for future research is the design of policies to compen- 
sate parties at  risk from the siting of a new facility. In the case of LNG 
there are many potential causes of an accident (e.g. ships, tanks, etc.), so 
it may be difficult to attribute fault to any one party. Furthermore, the 
ships, the liquefied natirral gas, and the terminals are owned by different 
subsidiaries and companies. The local, national, and international jurisd- 
ictions make legal problems even more difficult (Davis 1979). 
One possible direction for future study is the role of insurance as a 
way of protecting potential victims against potential property losses and 
physical injury. A U S  General Accounting Office report of July 1978 con- 
cluded that injured parties could not be fully compensated for a serious 
accident under present liability arrangements. What type of insurance 
arrangements are feasible between private firms and the industrial 
partners who are involved in the shipping, storage, and transmission of 
LNG? What role is appropriate for government to play with respect to 
offering protection? The Price Anderson Act as it applies to nuclear 
safety may provide some guidance in the design of some system of liabil- 
ity whch involves joint private industry-federal government financial 
responsibility. 
With respect to the more immediate consequences of siting a new 
facility, O'Hare (1977) has proposed a particular type of compensation 
scheme whereby each community proposed as a potential site deter- 
mines a minimum level of per capita compensation so that it is willing to 
make a legal commitment to have the project in their backyard if the 
compensation is paid. The applicant would utilize t h s  compensation as 
part of h s  calculations as to the relevant costs associated with locating 
the facilities in community A,B, or C. The final decision would then be 
made by the applicant taking into account the amount of compensation it 
would have to pay residents in each of these three localities. 
This type of system would only be applied to potential sites that had 
satisfied specific governmental criteria related to safety and environmen- 
tal risk. O'Hare (1977) recognizes that there will still be some individuals 
in a given community who will be compensated more than they need to be 
and others who will not be rewarded enough. He also recognizes that for 
such a system to be implemented there must be good information on the 
relevant costs, including an environmental impact statement and that the 
system has to be designed to overcome the incentive to overbid. 
Whether or not some type of compensation scheme is a useful policy 
prescription depends on the specifics of the situation. In t h s  connection, 
it would be interesting to ask what type of payments would have been 
required to appease the citizens of Oxnard so that an LNG terminal could 
have been located there? What would the Sierra Club require in payments 
so that they would support a site which might have adverse environment 
effects? These questions can only be answered in a real world problem 
context. They do reflect an increasing concern of economists and lawyers 
in dealing with windfalls or wipeouts from specific actions whch involve 
the public sector. Hagman and Misczynski (1978) in their comprehensive 
study of the subject believe that windfalls should be partially recaptured 
to help compensate for wipeouts. They propose a number of alternative 
mechanisms for amelioratmg this problem ranging from special assess- 
ments to development permits. These types of policy instruments could 
also be investigated in the context of specific siting problems. 
The final outcome is likely to represent some type of balance 
between the political constraints and economic criteria. As Wildavsky 
(1981) has pointed out: 
The criterion of choice in politics and markets is not being right 
or correct as in solving a puzzle, but agreement based on 
interaction among partially opposed interests (p. 133). 
The framework presented in t h s  paper does not provide answers to 
the dilemma between economics and politics but it does help the analyst 
gain a better understanding of the causes of these conflicts. How one 
actually improves the process is a challenge for future problem-focused 
research. 
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